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In the summer of 2015, Kyiv is vibrant with intellectual and political discussions. 
As after any revolution, the debate is about what is wrong and what should be 
done.1 Policy people acknowledge that reforms are proceeding, but too slowly, 
while a typical business verdict is that corruption is as bad as before, but it has be-
come more disorganised since the old Yanukovych hierarchy has broken down.
The economic situation is frightful, with GDP falling by 17.2% in annualised 
terms in the first quarter of 2015 and annual inflation peaking at 61% in April. 
But much has gone right, more than Ukrainians usually notice. What everyone 
recognises is that Ukraine has a strong civil society. People are active both in 
discussions and in deeds. The state functions poorly, but volunteers help every-
where, from the battlefields to hospital beds and schools. Civil activists expose 
corruption and its culprits every day, often forcing top officials to leave office 
after prolonged struggles. Street protests are commonplace.
This article attempts to offer a picture of the state of the economic reform. What 
has been done and what has failed so far? The first section offers a periodisation 
of Ukraine’s economic policy since its independence in 1991. It suggests that 
Ukraine has seen three periods of significant reform and this is by far the most 
important. The second section argues that the main cause of Ukraine’s current 
economic decline is Russian warfare. The third section clarifies the differences 
between the current situation and that after the Orange Revolution in late 2004. 
The fourth section explains how the current reform efforts are more far-reaching 
than earlier attempts, especially in the energy and banking sectors. Finally, four 
risks to the present reform wave are discussed.
1. A PERIODISATION OF UKRAINE’S ECONOMIC POLICY SINCE 1991
Ukraine’s economy has persistently underperformed. It has done far worse than 
any of its big neighbours, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. In 1990, Ukraine, Poland, 
and Turkey were at similar levels in terms of GDP per capita in purchasing power 
parities. Since then, Poland and Turkey have approximately doubled their GDP 
per capita at fixed prices, while Ukraine has declined by one-fifth according to 
the World Bank (2014). Moldova is the other post-Soviet country in Europe that 
has performed as poorly as Ukraine. 
If we instead compare GDP per capita at current prices and exchange rates in 
1989 and in 2013, we find that Ukraine was slightly ahead of Russia and at the 
level of Poland and Turkey in 1989, while the three other countries were at a level 
approximately three times higher than Ukraine’s in 2013 (IMF 2014). With the 
1  A general background to this article can be found in my new book: Åslund (2015a).
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large depreciation of the Ukrainian hryvnia in 2014, Ukraine’s GDP per capita at 
current prices has fallen to one-sixth of the Polish level.
How could this happen? The explanation is that Ukraine has suffered from 
pervasive corruption. Ukraine’s independence was driven by two interest groups. 
One was Rukh, the primarily West-Ukrainian nationalist movement that wanted 
independence and a strong Ukrainian state without any clear economic views, 
but it was never supported by more than one-quarter of the population. The other 
interest group of importance was the old Soviet Ukrainian nomenklatura of the 
east that wanted two things, power and money. 
The Ukrainian state was formed by a coalition of these two interest groups. In 
a somewhat simplified form, one may say that the nationalists handed political 
and economic power to the old nomenklatura as long as they accepted the Ukrain-
ian nation and the promotion of Ukrainian national symbols and language. The 
problem with this alliance was that nobody cared about economic policy. 
Ukraine’s economic policy and its results are well illustrated by its real eco-
nomic growth rates from 1989 until 2014.
We can distinguish between five different periods. First, in the early transition, 
in 1991–1994, Ukraine had no economic policy, which led to hyperinflation and 
massive output fall. Ukraine did far worse than Russia, which attempted serious 
reform, even if it did not quite succeed. 
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Figure 1. Ukrainian GDP growth, 1989–2015
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2015.
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Second, in 1994–1995, President Leonid Kuchma carried out elementary mar-
ket reforms and fiscal stabilisation as Kyiv concluded its first IMF program in 
October 1994. However, the economy was not sufficiently liberated in order for it 
to start growing. In 1995–1999, GDP continued to shrink. In the decade of 1989–
1999, it fell by a total of 61% compared with 52% for Russia, whereas Poland’s 
GDP rose by 22% (UN ECE 2000: 225). Evidently, Poland had surged ahead 
thanks to its early, radical, and comprehensive market reforms (Sachs 1993).
Third, in the first quarter of 2000, Ukraine enjoyed its second great reform 
spurt after President Kuchma was re-elected and Viktor Yushchenko became 
Prime Minister. Finally, Ukraine started growing fast, at an average of 7.5% a 
year, from 2000 to 2007. This was Ukraine’s only successful period. To the disap-
pointment of many, the Orange Revolution of November-December 2004 did not 
result in any new reform wave, but in chaos. 
Fourth, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 exposed the overheating of 
Ukraine’s finances. The country had thrived on a big financial bubble, which 
burst in September 2008. Its GDP plunged by 15% in 2009 (IMF 2014). The 
aftermath of the crisis brought little relief to Ukraine. Although it had suffered 
such a severe crisis, its recovery has been slow and partial. In 2012 and 2013, 
it recorded no growth at all because of Yanukovych’s miserable, predatory eco-
nomic policies. 
The fifth period started with a new big decline in output in 2014, largely caused 
by Russian warfare as discussed below. The question is whether this crisis will be 
utilised. As it appears at present, Ukraine is in its third reform wave. Will this go 
deeper and be more successful than those in 1994 and 2000?
To sum up, only in the 8 years between 2000 and 2007 did Ukraine perform 
well economically. Other countries that had similarly poor economic perform-
ance in the 1990s were Russia, Moldova, and Kazakhstan. These four countries 
had ended up in an under-reform trap of rent seeking and oligarchy (Åslund et al. 
2001). Around 2000, they all broke out of it and started growing fast, but Ukraine 
has got stuck once again.
More than any other post-communist country, Ukraine has been ruled by a 
score of big businessmen that have captured the state (EBRD 1999). They domi-
nate large sectors of the Ukrainian economy, notably energy, metallurgy, min-
ing, and the chemical industry, letting neither foreigners nor smaller Ukrainian 
businessmen into these sectors. They made their fortunes through rent seeking, 
primarily the gas trade, in the early 1990s, and by capturing the state, they have 
managed to maintain their rents. The oligarchs have controlled the state through 
large representation of their own in parliament and in the government, but they 
have also bought all kinds of services from senior officials (Åslund 2009). 
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Improved governance is crucial for higher economic growth and greater eco-
nomic welfare, and governance becomes more important for growth as an econ-
omy advances (Acemoglu 2008). Among post-communist countries, Ukraine has 
a curious position with regard to freedom and corruption. It is as corrupt as the 
standard post-Soviet country, but it enjoys much greater political freedom. Hard-
ly any country that is so corrupt has such great transparency and freedom. This 
is no equilibrium. Either corruption and authoritarianism, or freedom and good 
governance are likely to win. 
All the Central and Eastern European countries that have become members 
of the European Union have advanced to full democracy and succeeded in limit-
ing their corruption. They have entered a stable equilibrium, with democratic 
forces checking that the government cannot become too corrupt.2 Most of the 
post-Soviet countries, by contrast, have ended up in a suboptimal equilibrium 
with great corruption that is being maintained by predatory authoritarian regimes, 
which benefit from the corruption. The question is in which direction Ukraine 
will move, towards less corruption or towards more authoritarianism.
This uncommon situation can be explained by the prominent role of oligarchs 
in Ukrainian society. Competition between the big business groups has kept 
Ukraine quite an open society, but they have also rendered society corrupt and 
unequal to their benefit, which led to the Orange Revolution in 2004 (Åslund – 
McFaul 2006).3 
President Viktor Yanukovych, by contrast, tried to consolidate power in the 
hands of his family as in most other post-Soviet countries. In doing so, he turned 
against both the people and the oligarchs. An important reason for his demise 
was that powerful big businessmen owned most of the television channels, which 
exposed Yanukovych’s wrongdoings.
2. UKRAINE’S MAIN ECONOMIC PROBLEM: RUSSIAN WARFARE
After two years of stagnation in 2012–13, Ukraine’s economy has deteriorated 
sharply.4 Its GDP contracted by 6.8% in 2014, and it is forecast to shrink by 
another 9% in 2015 – a total loss of roughly 16% over two years. In mid-2015, 
2  It is possible that Hungary will slip away from this favourable equilibrium, but that has not 
been recorded as yet.
3  The best book on post-Soviet oligarchs is Freeland’s (2000) discussion of the Russian oli-
garchs in the 1990s. Frishberg (2006) has written extensively about the Ukrainian oligarchs 
without mentioning their real names, while Puglisi (2003) and Åslund (2009) have named 
them and their companies.
4  This section draws on Åslund (2015b).
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things seem to be stabilising. The depreciation of the hryvnia has eliminated 
the country’s current-account deficit, and a massive fiscal adjustment brought 
Ukraine’s budget into cash balance in the second quarter of 2015, but the situa-
tion remains precarious.
Although corruption is a severe and long-standing problem, Ukraine’s primary 
economic challenges are no longer homegrown; they are the result of Russian 
aggression. The country’s belligerent eastern neighbour has annexed Crimea, 
sponsored rebels in eastern Ukraine, pursued a trade war, intermittently cut off its 
supply of natural gas, and is threatening financial attack. So far, Ukraine has mi-
raculously managed to withstand these assaults with little international support, 
but it is in desperate need of assistance.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 seized 4% of Ukraine’s GDP. 
Since then, Russian-supported armed forces have occupied territories in eastern 
Ukraine that accounted for 10% of the country’s GDP in 2013. With the Donbas 
region’s production having plummeted by 70% in the months since, this has cost 
Ukraine some 7% of its 2013 GDP (Dragon Capital 2014).
Less noticed is that Russia is also pursuing a trade war against Ukraine. Last 
year alone, Ukraine lost half of its exports to Russia, amounting to 12% of 
Ukraine’s total exports in 2013, and this decline has been aggravated this year. 
Since 2013, Russian trade sanctions have slashed Ukraine’s exports to the coun-
try by 70% – accounting for a drop of 18% in Ukraine’s total exports. Russia 
pursues all kinds of illicit trade sanctions against Ukraine.
Ukraine’s previously substantial agricultural exports to Russia have been re-
stricted through phytosanitary regulations amounting to unfounded prohibitions. 
Steel exports have been blocked through personalised antidumping actions. In 
addition, Russian state enterprises have stopped purchases from Ukraine as a 
matter of policy. That Russia became a member of the World Trade Organization 
in 2012 has had no positive impact. Naturally, the Ukrainian exports of arma-
ments to Russia have declined. Logistical issues, the lack of alternative commer-
cial links, and the specialisation of some products meant that the goods could not 
be redirected in the short term. This loss is likely to correspond to a 6% decline 
in Ukraine’s GDP.
All businessmen are aware of Russia’s assault on Ukraine, and few want to 
invest in a war zone. As a consequence, Ukraine’s net foreign direct investment, 
which was steadily slightly over 3% of GDP a year before the start of hostilities, 
has evaporated. This implies a reduction of 3% of GDP. Furthermore, Ukraine 
has faced an intermittent gas war. A financial assault may be yet to come.
Leaving Crimea aside, we may conservatively assess Ukraine’s economic 
losses from Russia’s aggression, amounting to roughly 7% from lost produc-
tion in occupied eastern Ukraine, 6% losses from trade sanctions, plus 3% from 
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lost foreign direct investment amounts to 16% of GDP. That is, the total amount 
Ukraine is estimated to have lost from the beginning of 2014 to the end of 2015.
Russia’s apparent but undeclared aim is to make sure that democratic Ukraine 
fails, without looking entirely guilty of having caused that failure. This leads to 
an important conclusion: Ukraine is not the culprit but the victim, and it should 
be treated accordingly. 
On July 1, Russia re-opened an old front in its economic war on Ukraine when 
the energy giant Gazprom, which is majority-owned by the Russian state and 
pursues Russian foreign-policy objectives, decided to cut off the country’s gas 
supply. Given the global gas surplus, Europe is in a position to tell Russia in no 
uncertain terms that its corrupt practices are no longer acceptable. 
3. HOW THE CURRENT SITUATION DIFFERS 
FROM THE ORANGE REVOLUTION
Overtly, the Euromaidan or revolution of dignity of 2013–14 appears quite similar 
to the Orange Revolution of 2004. Will the new democratic government be able 
to avoid the mistakes and disorder in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution? 
The present situation is quite different, but the policy lessons from the mistakes 
of the Orange Revolution remain poignant.
The mood after Euromaidan could not be more different from the atmosphere 
after the Orange Revolution. Then, the victors and the population were caught in 
euphoria after a peaceful and swift democratic breakthrough. After the Maidan 
was tainted with blood and Ukraine subject to severe Russian military aggres-
sion, the Ukrainian mood is sombre. The challenge of the democratic government 
is to save the nation.
This time, the public mood is characterised by justified suspicions. Everybody 
understands how deeply ingrained corruption is also among the democratic op-
position. Civic society has grown much stronger. It is not prepared to give any 
authorities the benefit of the doubt. In 2004, the economy had grown by 12%, 
limiting economic concerns, while it was declining in 2014. Ukraine had large 
twin deficits in 2013, which had to be cured. 
A decade ago, the European Union was a distant perspective. Now Ukraine has 
signed the substantial Association Agreement, which amounts to a civilisational 
choice. It contains a blueprint for a reform of the Ukrainian state along European 
lines, and the EU has committed substantial technical assistance to achieving this 
goal.
Two big lessons stand out from the Orange Revolution. The first policy must 
be to make a clear break with the prior corrupt political and judicial system. 
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Given that the existing parliament was pervasively corrupt, early parliamentary 
elections were essential. A corrupt person is not likely to turn honest, but needs 
to be replaced by a person who has not been corrupted as yet. The greater the 
turnover in the elite, the better it is. Many institutions, such as the government, 
can be cleansed by a decent parliament, but that is not true of the courts and law 
enforcement. 
The second broad policy must be to eliminate the main political and economic 
mechanisms of corruption fast, so that the new rulers are not corrupted by the old 
system. The incentives must be set right. This cannot be done gradually because 
then the new rulers will be corrupted by the old system, and the reform will never 
be completed. Classical corruption traps, such as various fixed prices for gas 
between which rent seekers can arbitrate, must be eliminated as soon as possible 
and not in steps over several years. Similarly, corrupt enterprise subsidies must be 
abolished. State procurement cannot be made competitive gradually. It should be 
done in one single step. Where negative social effects arise, they should be dealt 
with through direct cash compensation. Ukraine has a developed system of 745 
social welfare bureaus across the country that can and should be used.
4. MORE FAR-REACHING REFORM EFFORTS THAN PREVIOUSLY
The key thing was to achieve a clear break with the old system politically, legally, 
and economically.5 Soon after the democratic breakthrough in February 2014, 
Ukraine carried out early presidential and parliamentary elections. Pro-European 
reformers won both elections, laying a political base for serious democratic and 
market economic reforms. However, until the parliamentary elections on October 
26, the old vested interests dominated parliament, blocking most reform legisla-
tion. These elections gave reform a political mandate.
On December 2, a new government was appointed. It is younger and more 
qualified than any previous Ukrainian government. In the last Yanukovych gov-
ernment, only two ministers spoke English, while in the current government, 
only two out of 20 ministers do not speak English. The typical new minister is a 
38- year-old investment banker with a Western MBA. Many ministers are not cor-
rupt and they are strongly committed to sensible reforms. Radical anti-corruption 
reforms are usually carried out by young, well-educated outsiders, who are free 
from the old system. Of Ukraine’s twenty ministers, only five had been ministers 
before December 2014. Ukraine has got a credible reform team.
5  This section draws on Åslund (2015c).
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On December 9, the new government presented its reform program, which was 
the kind of program Ukraine needed: brief and focused on key reforms. It was 
criticised within the coalition because it did not contain all the measures of the 66-
page-long coalition agreement, but that was its strength: it offered a clear focus.
The new government started with a Sisyphean task, to adopt a new budget 
for 2015 and to conclude a new loan agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund. A budget was hastily adopted on New Year’s Eve, but it had to be redone. 
In January, the IMF arrived with an unprecedentedly large mission of 25 profes-
sionals that worked for one month with the new government. The result was an 
unexpectedly strong financial stabilisation program, a four-year Extended Fund 
Facility. It was agreed on February 12 (IMF 2015).
In April 2014, Ukraine and the IMF had concluded a standby program, but it 
was never more than a stopgap measure to keep Ukraine afloat until new elec-
tions were held. It contained too little reform, fiscal adjustment, and international 
financing. The new IMF program is stronger in all these key regards. One of the 
critical concerns is that Ukraine’s economic situation is truly terrible. Last year, 
the IMF had anticipated a GDP fall of 5%, but it became 6.8%. 
A key aspect of Ukraine’s economic crisis is that its international currency 
reserves have run low. From February 23 to 25, the country experienced a real 
financial meltdown. Temporarily, the exchange rate of the hryvnia collapsed from 
20 hryvnia per dollar to 40 hryvnia. Panic erupted. People rushed to the shops 
to buy whatever they could. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has sensibly 
adopted a floating exchange rate as recommended by the IMF and minimised 
interventions. But Ukraine’s international reserves had declined to $5 billion, just 
over one month of imports, which was far too little.
The reason for the dwindling reserves has been a lack of international financial 
support. Last year, Ukraine’s international debt obligations were far larger than 
the international credits it received. Even the IMF disbursed only $4.6 billion, 
while it received $3.6 billion in repayments, so its net credits to Ukraine were 
merely $1 billion. Incredibly, on October 30, the European Commission forced 
Ukraine to pay Gazprom $3.1 billion of disputed arrears without offering any ad-
ditional support to Ukraine. This large payment brought Ukraine’s reserves below 
the critical level. The EU purpose was entirely self-centred – to make sure that 
Gazprom continued to deliver gas to EU countries during the winter.
The new IMF program made all the difference. On its own, it was not sufficient 
to impress the market, but on March 2, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted eight 
important laws as prior actions. Then people knew the IMF funding would arrive, 
which turned the market around. These laws involved energy prices, the budget, 
and taxation. On March 11, the IMF Executive Board adopted its program for 
Ukraine, and the next day a disbursement of $5 billion was made, doubling the 
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Ukrainian currency reserves. The exchange rate has stabilised at 21–22 hryvnia 
per dollar as the IMF predicted, but currency regulations remain severe, impeding 
foreign trade. On July 31, the IMF Executive Board decided to make a second 
disbursement under this program of $1.7 billion since Ukraine had complied with 
the demands of the program and adopted all the prior actions for the second dis-
bursement that the IMF required.
The IMF program foresees $40 billion of international financing for Ukraine 
during four years, of which $10 billion shall be disbursed in the first year. The 
problem is that other financing is minimal. The EU is offering credits of about 
$2 billion, the United States $2 billion, Japan $1.6 billion, the World Bank $2 
billion, China $2.4 billion, and Germany $800 million. Optimistically, this fi-
nancing might amount to $12 billion, but virtually all of this is credits, some not 
very soon and some short-term. Therefore, the IMF has called for a restructuring 
of Ukraine’s foreign Eurobonds of a total of $23 billion. The IMF hopes that 
Ukraine can save $15.3 billion by a combination of longer bond maturities, lower 
yields, and reduced face value of the bonds. This is a complicated negotiation 
and the outcome is by no means given, but on July 31, media announced that the 
bondholders had offered a haircut of 5%, while the Ukrainian government calls 
for 40%. The IMF wanted to see some progress in these negotiations before its 
second disbursement.
Ukraine’s debt situation is further complicated by Russia owning a Eurobond of 
$3 billion that it insists on getting back in full. The key issue is whether the Rus-
sian debt is to be considered private or sovereign. In fact, it is both and gives Rus-
sia both advantages. Thus, Russia is adding a financial battlefield in its war against 
Ukraine. The international financing for Ukraine remains desperately short. 
The large and unsuccessful bailout program for Greece had an indirect impact 
on the fate of Ukraine. The Greek Program that started in 2010 has consumed 
most of the EU policymaking capacity and the EU has no appetite for any more 
bailouts. As a result, the EU has only committed some €5 billion to Ukraine in 
2014–15, while the total bailout to Greece has risen to some €300 billion, al-
though Ukraine is in an existential crisis and the country’s collapse under Russian 
aggression and financial strains would also put Europe in jeopardy.
The implementation of Ukraine’s reforms has been impressive. Until July 2015, 
Ukrainian parliament adopted close to 400 laws. For the first time, Ukraine saw 
far-reaching structural reforms. The most impressive reforms have taken place in 
the energy and banking sectors. These reforms have also led to a substantial fiscal 
adjustment.
From the beginning of 2015, the coal subsidies were abolished, which had cost 
1% of GDP previously. On April 1, Ukraine raised all energy prices to half the 
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cost recovery level. Gas tariffs for households quadrupled. Wasteful energy sub-
sidies that amounted to 10% of GDP in 2014 are set to fall to 2% of GDP in 2015. 
Of this amount, 6% of GDP comes from the abolition of subsidies, and 2% of 
GDP because of lower international energy prices. At the same time, Ukraine has 
redirected its imports of gas to Europe, which now accounts for most of Ukraine’s 
gas imports, with Gaz de France and Statoil being the main suppliers. Gazprom 
has been forced to cut its prices, but Ukraine prefers to purchase from Europe 
given that Gazprom has proven utterly unreliable in its deliveries and tends to 
change prices all of a sudden.
At the same time, special pensions to privileged groups have been cut down 
and pensions are not supposed to be indexed until December, reducing the costs 
of pensions by probably 6% of GDP from 16% of GDP in 2014 to a more normal 
10% of GDP in 2015. Thus, Ukraine is carrying out a fiscal adjustment of some 
14% in 2015, though military expenditures are supposed to increase from 1.6% 
of GDP to 6% of GDP, but that still amounts to a fiscal adjustment in the order of 
10% of GDP, which is very substantial. 
Much of Ukraine’s banking was outright corrupt with extensive related lend-
ing, often of 80% of all assets or even more. Since the fall of Yanukovych, the 
NBU has taken over no less than 53 collapsing banks out of 182 and put them into 
administration. The NBU is likely to take over a similar number of banks from 
among the rest. This leads to a valuable purgatory of the banking system, but 
in the short term, it means that the banks in restructuring are not offering much 
credit, which depresses the economy.
In parallel, Ukraine has carried out substantial deregulation, abolished a dozen 
inspection agencies, prolonged and simplified agricultural leaseholds, and many 
more things. Real reform is underway.
5. RISKS TO THE REFORMS
The risks to the Ukrainian reform program are many and great. Four threats stand 
out: Russian aggression, insufficient international funding, lagging reforms of 
law enforcement, and domestic political challenges arising from the miserable 
economic performance.
(1) The prime Kremlin aim appears to be to destabilise Ukraine so that the cur-
rent democratic regime fails. As discussed above, Russian aggression is massive 
and manifold. Direct warfare causes the greatest damage, but the second biggest 
impact comes from the trade war that attracts little international attention. Russia 
also pursues an intermittent gas war against Ukraine, and financial warfare is to 
be expected. To this comes subversion with dozens of bomb attempts in otherwise 
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peaceful parts of Ukraine and a massive infiltration of secret police agents. All 
these factors harm business and deter foreign investors. 
(2) Ukraine’s financial critical need is to raise its international currency reserves 
to some $20 billion, while they were just $10.3 billion at the end of June 2015. 
The best way of reinforcing Ukraine’s reserves would be if the European central 
banks offered a swap credit of some $10 billion to the NBU. These credits would 
function like the stabilisation fund Poland received from the West in 1990 (Sachs 
1993). That funding should exist but never be touched because if Ukraine’s other 
reserves fell below a certain level, the creditors would be entitled to impose new 
policies that would strengthen the reserve situation. The money would stay in 
European capitals and never be used, but this backstop would calm the currency 
market so that Ukraine could ease its draconian currency regulations.
(3) The power of the old vested interests has not been broken, especially in law 
enforcement. Ukraine has 19,000 prosecutors and 10,000 judges. Since virtually 
all Ukrainian prosecutors and judges are considered corrupt, they should all be 
sacked through lustration as was so wisely done in eastern Germany after reuni-
fication. There, roughly one-third of the replaced prosecutors were young East 
Germans, one-third West Germans, and one-third retrained East German pros-
ecutors (Staats 2011: 98). Law enforcement requires a similar purification. The 
number of Ukrainian judges and prosecutors should probably be halved. Ukraine 
adopted a law on lustration last fall, but only about 2,000 senior officials have 
been sacked. One obstacle is the resistance of the old elite that appeals to the still 
corrupt courts and usually wins. Another problem is the Council of Europe, which 
opposes and delays the vital lustration with all kinds of more or less irrelevant 
legal arguments. Without cleaning out the top rung of the judiciary, Ukraine’s 
reforms cannot succeed.
(4) The economic situation may just be too terrible so that people give up on 
reforms that appear to be too slow and opt for populism. Typically, this happens 
about two years after a democratic breakthrough, and Ukraine is planning local 
and regional elections on October 25, 2015. These elections are likely to occur 
at a time when the economy is at its nadir. Last February, the IMF predicted 
Ukraine’s GDP would fall by 5.5% in 2015. By April, it had cut its forecast to 
9%. Rising populism is evident in the political debate, parliamentary votes, and 
opinion polls.
Officially, the coalition consists of 296 deputies out of a total of 450 seats, and 
226 votes are needed to adopt legislation. Most reform laws pass with about 270 
votes. Out of 582 draft laws that the government had put to parliament until the 
end of May, only 44 percent were adopted. Many important laws do go through, 
but often laws are sidelined by procedural means because the coalition lacks co-
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hesion and the reform process is slowed down. An underlying problem is that 
public understanding of market principles is surprisingly weak in Ukraine. The 
debate usually deteriorates to what the government can do to help people, while 
the real question is how the burden of the state can be eased so that Ukraine can 
finally start developing. Ukraine’s public expenditures were 53% of GDP, while 
most countries in the region have a level of 35% of GDP, which would make 
sense also for a relatively poor country such as Ukraine. Opposition is building 
against increases in energy tariffs and the awful economic situation. 
There is an obvious risk that the ruling coalition will fracture. The Father-
land Party of Yulia Tymoshenko with 19 deputies votes persistently against the 
government and it belongs to the coalition in name only. The Radical Party of 
Oleh Lyashko with 21 mandates produces similar populist arguments, but tends 
to vote with the government. Self-Reliance with 32 deputies is undisciplined and 
unpredictable, but often tells the truth. These three parties all thrive on populist 
advocacy, and they are currently gaining popular support.
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s People’s Front with 81 deputies votes for 
government proposals as could be expected with good discipline, while President 
Petro Poroshenko’s bloc of 144 parliamentarians is a diverse and undisciplined 
herd. All too often, it hinders votes on government proposals. Both these parties 
have lost popular support, partly because they are accused of corruption, and partly 
because they do pursue reforms. The main reason that the prime minister and the 
president hang together is that otherwise they would hang separately, as Prime Min-
ister Yatsenyuk quoted Benjamin Franklin while in Washington on July 13–14. 
The risk that the window of opportunity will close is all too evident. Far more 
reforms have been accomplished in Ukraine than is generally understood both in 
Ukraine and the West, but the situation remains desperate. Russia plays with the 
country as a cat with a mouse. Ukraine needs more Western support, especially 
financial assistance, but it does not appear to be forthcoming. The economic situ-
ation is terrible. A GDP fall of 11% for the 2015 whole year appears probable and 
the standard of living is likely to fall much more. The economic hardship bears on 
the brave population, and the danger of a serious backlash is imminent.
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